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This thesis is a study on the strategic interactions between governments 
and firms under pollution. Governments make environmental policies and 
put them on their domestic firms. Firms decide their outputs and compete in 
the international market. Pollution are local or transboundary. 
First, we discuss governments’ preference when their firms compete Cournot 
in the international market. Our results suggest that under local pollution 
governments tend to apply looser environmental policies on their firms which 
decrease their production costs. However, these polices become more stringent 
if governments and firms are under transboundary pollution. 
Second, we analyze firms’ payoffs in Stackelberg competition and find that 
under this case, both governments and firms obtain less payoffs than what they 
can get when firms compete Cournot. This is different from the results that a firm 
can get more profits as the leader in Stackelberg model than its profits in 
Cournot model if there is no intervention from governments. 
 Finally, we discover governments’ and firms’ payoffs by collusion and 
compare all the possible choices for governments and firms. Our results shows 
that in the first stage governments choose collude in making environmental 






I would like to express all my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. 
Effrosyni Diamantoudi. She provided me over the entire course of this thesis by 
her great guidance, advice and support. My thesis would not have been 
completed without her strong commitment to excel in her part as my thesis 
supervisor. 
Besides, I would like to thank Prof. Ming Li whose advice are very helpful for 
me to improve my thesis.  I am indebted to the Graduate Program Director, 
Prof. Szilvia Papai and the Chair of the Department of Economics, Prof. Grec 
LeBlanc. I would thank to Prof. Licun Xue and Prof. Amy Poteete who are 
examination committee members for my thesis. I would also like to thank the 
administrative staff in the Department of Economics, Lise Gosselin, Lucy Gilson, 
Bonnie Janicki, and Elise M. Melancon, who were always very supportive and 
helpful during my whole study in the Department. 
 
Finally, I want to express my gratitude to my family who give me much warm 
















List of Figures                                                                                          vii   
 
List of Tables                                                                                                        viii 
 
Chapter 1:  Literature Review & Motivation -------------------------------------------------------1 
 
Chapter 2:  Impacts of Governmental Environmental policies on Firms  
                   in the Cournot competition -----------------------------------------------------------10 
2.1  Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------10 
2.2  Model ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------11 
  2.2.1  Firms’ profits --------------------------------------------------------------------------------12 
  2.2.2  Governments’ welfare ----------------------------------------------------------------------13 
  2.2.3   Solution --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------14 
2.3 Results --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------20 
2.4 Conclusion --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------27 
   
Chapter 3: Impacts of Governmental Environmental Policies  
                  on Firms in the Stackelberg competition -------------------------------------29 
 
3.1 Introduction ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------29 
3.2 Model under local pollution -----------------------------------------------------------------------29 
  3.2.1  Firms’ profits --------------------------------------------------------------------------------31 
  3.2.2 Governments’ welfare ------------------------------------------------------------------------------31 
  3.2.3 Solution ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------32 
3.3 Results ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34 
3.4 Model under transboundary pollution ---------------------------------------------------------36 
3.5 Results in the model under transboundary pollution ----------------------------------------39 




                         v 
 
Chapter 4: Governments’ and Firms’ collusion  under  
                  local&transboundary pollution -----------------------------------------------------------42 
 
4.1 Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------42 
4.2 Model under local pollution -------------------------------------------------------------------------43 
  4.2.1 Governments’ collusion without firms’ collusion ---------------------------------------45 
  4.2.2 Firms’ collusion without governments’ collusion ---------------------------------------46 
  4.2.3 Collusion for both governments and firms -----------------------------------------------46 
  4.2.4 Comparison among different cases --------------------------------------------------------47 
4.3 Results in the model under local pollution ---------------------------------------------------48 
4.4 Model under transboundary pollution ---------------------------------------------------------------49 
4.5 Results in the model under transboundary pollution ---------------------------------------------51 
4.6 Conclusion -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------52 
 




Appendix A ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61   
  A.1 Computation for Solutions -----------------------------------------------------------------61 
  A.2 Proof of Propositions -----------------------------------------------------------------68 
 
Appendix B ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 70   
  B.1 Computation for solutions ------------------------------------------------------------------70 
  B.2 Proof of Propositions -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------73 
 
Appendix C ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 82 
  C.1 Computation for solutions under  local pollution ------------------------------------------------82 
  C.2 Computation for solutions under  transboundary  pollution  -----------------------------------------------86 

















Figure 1: Governmental policies under local pollution in heterogeneous case ----------------------------23 
 
Figure 2: Firms’ outputs under local pollution in heterogeneous case ---------------------------------------23 
 
Figure 3: Firms’ profits under local pollution in heterogeneous case ----------------------------------------24 
 
Figure 4: Governments’ welfare under local pollution in heterogeneous case ----------------------------24 
 
Figure 5: Governmental policies under transboundary pollution in heterogeneous case ---------------25 
 
Figure 6: Firms’ outputs under transboundary pollution in heterogeneous case --------------------------25 
 
Figure 7: Firms’ profits under transboundary pollution in heterogeneous case ---------------------------26 
 
















































Table 2.1: Solution for homogeneous firms under local&transboundary pollution ------------------------16 
 
Table 2.2: Solution for heterogeneous firms under local pollution --------------------------------------------18 
 
Table 2.3: Solution for heterogeneous firms under transboundary pollution -------------------------------20 
 
Table 3.1: Solution for firms in Stackelberg competition under local pollution -----------------------------33 
 
Table 3.2: Solution for firms in Stackelberg competition under transboundary pollution ----------------38 
 
Table 4.1: Governmental policy and firm’s output under local pollution -------------------------------------47 
 
Table 4.2: Government’s welfare and firm’s profits under local pollution -----------------------------------47 
 
Table 4.3: Governmental policy and firm’s output under transboundary pollution ------------------------50 
 










































Literature Review & Motivation
As a part of economic development for centuries, trade plays an impor-
tant role to reduce global poverty by stimulate economic growth, creating
jobs, reducing prices, increasing the variety and qualities of goods for con-
sumers, and help countries and rms acquire new technologies. Trade es-
pecially international trade signicantly increase during the past decades.
The development of trade contributes to growth to investment, production,
technological progress, and so on.
In 2005, the value of world exports was over $10.3 trillion, one-third of
which originated in developing countries and one-third of which was sold
in these countries. China is a successful example that developing countries
could benet from international trade. Chinese economy develops fast during
the past thirty years and one important reason is its signicantly increasing
exportation to the rest of the world. International trade also much a¤ect
developed countrieseconomies. Over the past 40 years, international trade
has grown from 9.6% to 26% of the U.S. national economy. It implies that
more and more U.S. jobs are related to trade and that Americans can buy
more low-cost goods from abroad such as Mexico and India. As developing
countries (for example China) become richer and more integrated in the
global economy, they start to buy more and more American goods. About
45% of U.S. exportation go to developing countries today, compared with
39% ten years ago.
Although the direct e¤ects of international trade on the economy are posi-
tive, as measured by Gross Domestic Product, concerns rise with regard to its
non-economice¤ects. At the Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) in Seattle in November 1999, some protestors launched the
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rst of the big anti-globalization demonstrations. They wore turtle costumes
to express their concerns that international trade in shrimp was harming sea
turtles by ensnaring them in nets. They criticized that a WTO panel had, in
the name of free trade, negated the ability of the United States to protect the
turtles and undermined the international environment. Subsequently, doubts
on international trade and relevant protests became common at international
conferences.
The development of international trade stimulates the increase of pro-
duction of goods. When rms produce more goods, they may generate more
pollution from their production activities. Antweiler et al., (2001), Harbaugh
et al., (2002), Cole and Elliott (2003), Frankel and Rose (2005) provide a
number of empirical studies on the relationship between international trade
openness and environmental quality. Economists call pollution as an exter-
nality for the economic development. It means that individuals and rms,
and sometimes even countries, lack the incentive to control their pollution,
because they have strong incentives to keep the competitiveness of their goods
in international trade. This often occurs in developing countries which under-
value the environmental cost caused by the pollution. Grossman and Krueger
(1993, 1995), and the World Bank (1992) show an inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship for a cross section of countries: at relatively low levels of income
per capita, economic growth leads to greater environmental damage, until it
levels o¤ at an intermediate level of income, after which further growth leads
to improvements in the environment. Runge (1987), Grossman and Kreuger
(1991) nd that as trade grows and incomes raise, demands for a cleaner
environment tend to rise correspondingly, and new regulatory constraints
induce technological innovations which are more environment-friendly. .
Lucas, et al. (1992), study the toxic intensity implied by the composition
of manufacturing output, and state that trade-distorting policies increase
pollution in rapidly growing countries. Dean (2002) shows on net a positive
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e¤ect of liberalization for a certain level of income. Antweiler, Copeland and
Taylor (2001) and Copeland and Taylor (2001, 2003, 2004) also nd that the
net e¤ect of trade liberalization on SO2 concentrations is benecial. Some
scholars state that the negative impacts of trade on the environment are over-
valued In face, these impacts vary greatly in degree and by location. Runge
(1990), Harold and Runge (1993) show evidence that reducing subsidies and
trade distortions in agriculture are often helpful to reduce environmental
damages by lowering fertilizer and pesticide use and increasing the e¢ ciency
with which water and soil resources are used .
A number of literature (Vogel, 1995; Charnovitz and Weinstein, 2001)
show that it is often necessary for governments to intervene international
trade by making environmental policies. If no negative e¤ects of trade on
environment is found, then the trade e¤ects of the regulation are not at issue.
But if such negative e¤ects appear to be present, it opens the way for gov-
ernments to identify, in which its benets for the trade are weighed against
its harm to the environment (Hudec and Farber, 1992). While rms focus on
pursuing their own prots without concerns for the environmental pollution
related to their production activities, governments consider both of them
to maximize the welfare of the countries. Governments are responsible for
making suitable environmental policies to balance their domestic rmsprof-
its and the social environmental damage from the pollution that a¤ect their
countries. Barrett (1997, 2003) shows theoretically how multilateral trade
sanctions can sometimes successfully enforce a multilateral environmental
treaty such as the Montreal Protocol. During past decades, governments im-
pose some standards on environmental externalities which ensures that trade
liberalization is ultimately welfare-enhancing. For example, in United States,
since 1986 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has required a Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI), in which 10,000 U.S. manufacturers report annual
releases from their facilities into the air, ground and water of more than
300 toxic chemicals. These chemicals include asbestos, freon, and PCBs, as
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well as 20 toxic chemical categories such as lead compounds. As this list
continues to grow, rms and governments have an increasing basis to apply
measures such as TRI releases per product or per dollar of sales. Firms
performance may be di¤erent in this issue. Dow Chemical stopped injecting
hazardous wastes underground before the TRI began, but its competitor Du
Pont chemical failed to do so (Rice, 1993). Such regulatory framework could
bring double impacts: it creates a quantitative basis for reducing pollution
and increases rmsincentives to move production to foreign countries where
such policies are less strict.
However, in contrast to the pollution concerns over the impacts of more
liberal trade, some countries most directly involved in trade tend to focus on
another main issue, which is trade protectionism disguised as environmen-
tal action. In other words, environmental protection can be an excuse for
trade protectionism. If governments give in to protectionist arguments and
establish trade barriers, growth in trade will become slow and benet from
trade will decrease. Moreover, such barriers may not necessarily end up with
a better environment when they cut o¤ payo¤s from the trade. Another rea-
son for establishing these barriers is from domestic rms. Competing rms
in the international market which may not be particularly friendly to the
environment, sometimes seek to advocate or retain barriers to imports in the
name of environmental protection, when in fact it is their own prots they
are trying to protect. Thus, environmental concerns in such a case is really
an excuse for protectionism.
Besides, governments may have incentives to impose weak environmen-
tal standards on their domestic rms that compete in the imperfectly com-
petitive international markets. This is another type of trade protectionism
that governments neglect or undervalued the environmental damage in their
countries. The weak environmental standards make rms prot from the
marginal cost of abatement which is less than the marginal damage from
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pollution. These purposefully designed policies may confer competitive ad-
vantage upon the domestic rms against the foreign rms. Grimmett (1991),
Reistein (1991), Whalley (1991), Pearce (1992), Anderson and Blackhurst
(1992) explore this topic in early 1990s. Barrett (1994) shows that if the
domestic industry consists of one rm, the foreign industry is imperfectly
competitive, and competition in international markets is Cournot, then the
domestic government has an incentive to impose such a weak environmental
standard. A number of papers in the literature criticize this sort of weak
environmental standard policy. Barrett (1994) demonstrates that environ-
mental policy is inferior to industry policy as an instrument for improving
competitiveness. Markusen, Morey and Olewiler (1993) state that if a nation
neglects the internal impact in determining an "optimal" emission tax, the
welfare losses caused by its unilateral emission tax is greater than expected.
Burguet and Sempere (2003) show that decreasing tari¤ will stimulate gov-
ernments to make less stringent environmental policies. Diamantoudi and
Sartzetakis (2006) discuss the stability of international environmental agree-
ments among governments which make optimal emission standards on their
domestic rmsproduction.
This paper discusses the optimal environmental policy, in which both
rms prots and countrys social environmental damage are considered.
Government controls the social environmental damage in the country by its
environmental policy. Such policy may a¤ect the competitiveness of the do-
mestic rm in the international market since it a¤ects the rms environmen-
tal abatement cost. The rm may have incentive to move to another country
where it can prot from a lower environmental abatement cost than it can
obtain from its home country because of countriesdi¤erent environmental
policies. McGuire (1982) presents a theoretical analysis of the movement
of capital across boundaries resulting from environmental regulation. Low
and Yeats (1992) state that environmentally "dirty" industries migrated to
lower income countries where environmental standards are weaker. Lucas,
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Wheeler, and Hettiges (1992) empirical studies test that the OECD coun-
triesenvironmental policies drive dirty industries to developing countries.
Rauscher (1993) also nds that in an open economy, the polluting industry
of the home country will migrate to the foreign country with looser environ-
mental policies. However, some scholars hold di¤erent opinions. Dean (1992)
claims that the link between trade ows and environmental standards is weak
or nonexistent. In an earlier paper, Leonard and Duerksen (1980) analyze the
investment and trade data to track the relationship between environmental
policies and the migration of pollution-intensive industries. Their statistical
results reveal that the growth of U.S. investment in developing countries did
not exceed the entire overseas investment growth rate.
This paper focuses on how governmental environmental policy and trade
interact under di¤erent types of pollution and how they a¤ect countriesand
rms payo¤s. Unlike Barrett (1994), this paper considers not only local
pollution but also transboundary pollution. The paper nds whether the
pollution is local or transboundary could be a crucial factor of consideration
for government to make its environmental policy. Unlike Hoel and Schneider
(1997), this paper treats a rm and its home government as two separate
entities. The rm considers only its own prot and neglects the social en-
vironmental damage while the government takes both into account. Unlike
the paper of Lanoie, Lucchetti, Johnstone and Ambec (2011) which shows
evidence that governmental environmental policies will stimulate rmsenvi-
ronmental innovation, we discuss the impacts of governmental environmental
policies on rmscompetition and prots in this paper.
To be simplied, we analyze the competition between two rms which are
located in two di¤erent countries. These two rms produce a same product
and sell in the international market. We assume that no other producer and
no other parties can make inuence on the market. It is a case for duopoly
and rms can choose di¤erent types of competition in the market. They may
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decide their outputs independently and simultaneously (Cournot model), or
move before the other rm (Stackelberg model) or cooperate with each other
(Collusion model). Firmsmotivation is to maximize their prots, so they
need consider their revenues and costs. Each rms revenue is decided by
its output and its competitors output. Its cost includes production cost
which is xed and environmental abatement cost which is a¤ected by its
governments environmental policy. Governments decide their environmen-
tal policies before their rmsproductions. Each government maximizes its
countrys welfare which is its domestic rms prots minus the relevant social
environmental damage in the country. Thus, it needs balance its domestic
rms prots and the environmental cost from the pollution when it make the
policy. In this paper, pollution could be purely local or transboundary. We
discuss the impact of government environmental policies on rms in di¤erent
types of competition and under di¤erent types of pollution.
Golden (1993) suggests that di¤erences in environmental policies or stan-
dards commonly exist across countries, especially between North and South.
Mohnen (1988) and Brown, et. al., (1993) discuss important terms of trade
e¤ects arising from transboundary externalities. Krutilla (1991), Merrield
(1988), Antle and Just (1992), and Anderson (1992) attempt to integrate
externalities theory with the neoclassical theory of international trade. In
Chapter 2, we rstly discuss the cases where two rms with same produc-
tion cost react independently and play Cournot competition in the market.
Then, we assume that one rm would decrease its production cost and the
competition continues. Then governments would modify their environmen-
tal policies and rms would modify their outputs. By comparing the payo¤s
among di¤erent cases, we show how governmental environmental policies af-
fects rmsincentives to decreases their production costs which reect the
technology progress. We also analyze how di¤erent types of pollution (local
or transboundary) play di¤erent roles in this evolution.
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In a duopoly competition without intervention from governments, it is
not surprising that each rm has incentive to decide its output and produce
before its competitor since the rst move can bring more prots to the leader
rm. However, if we consider the pollution issue and introduce governmen-
tal environmental policies, the result might be di¤erent. In Chapter 3, we
analyze rms incentives to play as the rst mover in the competition. In
such Stackelberg competition, payo¤s of the leader rm and the follower rm
are compared, as well as welfare of their countries. We also compare the
prots one rm obtains in the Cournot competition with what it can get
as the leader in the Stackelberg competition. Based on results from these
comparison, we state that rms prefer compete under Cournot in stead of
Stackelberg and their preference are welcome by their governments.
Barrett (1997, 2003) proves that governments have incentives to collude
in deciding their environmental policies and making a multilateral environ-
mental treaty such as the Montreal Protocol. In Chapter 4, we analyze the
cases for collusion. We assume that two governments could cooperate to
make environmental policies together or make them independently and that
two rms could cooperate to decide their outputs together or decide them
independently. We analyze all the possibilities and compare the payo¤s of
governments and rms in di¤erent cases. It look likes a two-stage game. In
the rst stage, two governments decide to collude or not in making envi-
ronmental policies. In the second stage, based on the known environmental
policies from their governments, two rms decide to collude or not in decid-
ing their outputs. Then, from the comparison of governmentsand rms
payo¤s, we nd that collusion is the best choice for both governments and
rms.
Based on the results we nd in Chapters 2, 3 and 4, we make our con-
clusion in Chapter 5. First, we prove that with governmental environmental
policies, rms prefer Cournot competition to Stackelberg competition in the
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international market. Second, we show that when rms compete Cournot
with governmental environmental policies, the circumstance of local pollution
stimulates rms to decreases their production costs while the circumstance
of transboundary pollution discourages rms to do so. Third, if collusion
is a possible choice, governments would make their environmental policies
together and rms would also collude in deciding their outputs.
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Chapter 2
Impacts of Governmental Environmental Policies on
Firms in the Cournot Competition
2.1 Introduction
Cournot competition is a kind of competition in the market in which rms
compete on the amount of output whey will produce, which they decide on
independently of each other and at the same time. Barrett (1994) claims
that under Cournot competition, governments have incentive to make loose
environmental polices to increase their domestic rmscompetitiveness in the
international market. Sanan and Zanaj (2007) discuss rmsenvironmental
innovation under Cournot competition. They state that when rms play a
la Cournot, they either both innovate to protect their market share in the
output market or they both choose not to innovate.
In this Chapter, we discuss the environmental policies that governments
make and apply on their domestic rms which play a la Cournot competition
in the inter national market. Such environmental policies could inuence
rms abatement costs thus inuence their competitiveness in the market.
Once rms know the environmental policies they have to respect, they would
reconsider the levels of their output to pursue maximum prots. Meanwhile,
when governments consider the environmental policies, they need care both
their domestic rmsprots and the social environmental damage due to the
pollution.
The model employed is a two-staged game involving two governments and
their two domestic rms. Firms sell all their products in the imperfectly com-
petitive international market. Pollution is local or transboundary. Based on
a certain type of pollution, governments move rst by making environmen-
tal policies for their domestic rms. Firms take these policies as given and
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compete by choosing their output levels. It is assumed that other countries,
whether or not they are consumer countries, have no means of inuencing
environmental policies in these two producer countries.
2.2 Model
We assume that there exist only two countries A;B. There exists one do-
mestic rm i in the country i; i 2 fA;Bg. We denote them rm A and rm
B which compete Cournot in the international market. Denote the prots
of rm A by A and the prots of rm B by B. Assuming that rm is
production cost per unit is ci. Government i decides ei and apply it on rm
i. ei reects the technology standard for environmental abatement. As ei de-
creases, the technology becomes more advanced which generate less pollution
and bring higher environmental abatement cost to the rm. ei = 1 means
that the government does not put any technology standard on its rm whose
environmental abatement cost is 0: ei = 0 means that the government would
require its rm to use the most adavnced technology to totally eliminate the
relevant pollution. Thus, the rm would assume the highest abatement cost.
To be realistic, we let 1 > ei > 0 in our model. Firm is output is qi and it
generates a certain level of pollution by its production. The pollution causes
the social environmental damage only in the country i under local pollution
while it causes the equal damage in both countries under transboundary pol-
lution. Since the pollution increases as qi increases and rm i must meet the
requirement of emission standard set by government i, rm is abatement
cost depends on both qi and ei. In the model, governments choose the emis-
sion standards ei in the rst stage and rms choose the output levels qi in
the second stage. Firms consider only their prots i while governments take
account into their domestic rmsprots and social environmental damage
in their countries. Let Wi be government is welfare. Government is welfare
equals to its domestic rm is prots minus the cost of social environmental
damage in its country. The environmental damage in the country is caused
11
by the production of the domestic rm. In our model, consumer welfare is
not considered. Government i considers its welfare by rm is prots and the
pollution in the country.
2.2.1 Firmsprots
Firms decide their outputs to maximize their prots. Their prots equal
to revenues minus costs. Their costs include production cost and environ-
mental abatement cost. They have the same environmental abatement cost
parameter d. Based on di¤erent cases, their production cost could be same
or di¤erent.
2.2.1.1 Homogeneous rms in production cost
Two rms are homogeneous in production cost per unit. cA = cB = c.
Their prot functions are as below.
Firm A: A = [a  b(qA+ qB)]qA  cqA  d(1  eA)qA (1)
Firm B: B = [a  b(qA+ qB)]qB  cqB  d(1  eB)qB (2)
where a; b; d are positive parameters. Firm is prot is its total revenue
[a  b(qA + qB)]qi minus its cost which is composed of total production cost
cqi and total environmental abatement cost d(1  ei)qi.
Two governments consider both domestic rms prot and social envi-
ronmental damage in the country. Government i controls rm is output
and pollution by making environmental policy ei which can a¤ect rm is
environmental abatement cost. Based on the nature of pollution (local or
translational), governmentswelfare functions are di¤erent.
2.2.1.2 Heterogeneous rms in production cost
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We consider the cases that two rms are homogeneous in production cost.
We assume that rm As production cost per unit is higher than that of rm
B. cA = c; cB = c and  2 (0; 1). Their prot functions are as below.
Firm A: A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA (3)
Firm B: B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB (4)
Here rm As production cost per unit is c and rm Bs production cost
per unit is c. As  2 (0; 1), rm B has cost advantage.
2.2.2 Governmentswelfare
Governments always make policies before their rmsproduction. Each
countrys welfare equals to its domestic rms prot minus the relevant social
environmental damage from the pollution. The pollution could be purely
local or transboundary.
2.2.2.1 Governmentswelfare with local pollution
Local pollution implies that pollution caused by rm is production in
country i does not inuence the other country. Then, governmentswelfare
functions are:
Government A: WA = A   t2e2A (5)
Government B: WB = B   t2e2B (6)
t is positive parameter. Government is welfare is its domestic rms
prot i minus the social environmental damage t2e
2
i in the country. In the
welfare function, rm is output qi and relevant pollution are internalized in
the governmental environmental policy ei.
2.2.2.2 Governmentswelfare with transboundary pollution
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Transboundary pollution implies that pollution caused by rm is pro-
duction in country i not only inuences its home country but also inuences
the other country. In this case, governmentswelfare functions are:
Government A: WA = A   t2(eA + eB)2 (7)
Government B: WB = B   t2(eA + eB)2 (8)
Compared with the case 2.2.1, the only di¤erence here is the social en-
vironmental damage which is expressed as t
2
(eA + eB)
2 in stead of t
2
e2i . It
shows that government is policy ei has a direct impact on the welfare of the
other country.
2.2.3 Solution
From the objective functions above, we could obtain the di¤erent solutions
based on rmsheterogeneities and types of pollution.
2.2.3.1 Homogeneous rms under local pollution and transbound-
ary pollution
For the case which includes two homogeneous rms with local pollution,
we have four functions (1), (2), (5), (6).
Assumption 2.1: To make our solutions are interior(1 > ei > 0; q

i >
0;for i 2 A;B), we set restrictions for parameter:
a  c  d > 0
9bt > 4d(a  c)
First, we solve rmsproblems:
max i = [a  b(qA + qB)]qi   cqi   d(1  ei)qi , for i 2 A;B
14
qi
s.t. qi > 0
ei 2 (0; 1)
After we get qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB), we plug them into governments
welfare functions:
max Wi = fa  b[qA(eA; eB)+ qB(eA; eB)]gqi (eA; eB)  cqi (eA; eB) d(1 
ei)q

i (eA; eB)  t2e2i
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1), for i 2 A;B







For two homogeneous rms with transboundary pollution, we have func-
tions (1), (2), (7), (8). The rst step is same as the case above. We have
qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB) for rms A, B. The second step is di¤erent as gov-
ernments here should consider not only domestic rms pollution but also
foreign rms pollution when they decide environmental policies. So we plug
qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB) into (7), (8) to solve:
max Wi = fa  b[qA(eA; eB)+ qB(eA; eB)]gqi (eA; eB)  cqi (eA; eB) d(1 
ei)q

i (eA; eB)  t2(eA + eB)2
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1) for i 2 A;B


















































W A = W

B = 4t(9bt  
8d2)(a c d)2=(18bt 4d2)2
Table 2.1 Solution for homogeneous rms under local&transboundary
pollution
To easily compare the solutions between two cases above, we put the
solutions in the table 2.1. It shows governmental policies, outputs, rms
prots and governmentswelfare in the case of homogeneous rms under
local&transboundary pollution.
2.2.3.2 Heterogeneous rms under local pollution
If two rms have the di¤erent production costs and they interact under
local pollution, we have functions (3), (4), (5) and (6) . The analysis is similar
to that in 2.3.1. In the rst step, we get rmsbest response function of their
outputs based on the governmental environmental policies. In the second
step, we put these best response functions in governmentswelfare functions
to obtain the optimal emission standards. Then we plug these optimal emis-
sion standards into rmsprot functions and governmentswelfare functions
to obtain the optimal outputs, prots and welfare. The only di¤erence from
2.3.1 is that here rm A and rm B are heterogeneous in production cost.
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As  2 (0; 1); rm B has the lower production cost than rm A. We
need max rm As and rm Bs prot functions and get their best response
functions separately.
Assumption 2.2: To make our solutions are interior, we set restrictions
for parameter:
3bt > 4d2
36bdt(a+ 3c) > 48cd3 + 27bt(4d2 + 3bt)
(a  c  d) (81b2t2   108bd2t+ 16d4   16d3) > 0
1 >  > 0
 > [12d2(a  c  d)  9bt(a  2c  d)]=9bct
 > [36bdt(a+ c+ 3d)  48ad3   81b2t2]=24cd(3bt  2d2)
 > [16d3(a+4c d) 4d2(a 5c d)(9bt 8d2) (a 2c d)(9bt 4d2)(9bt 
12d2)]=c (81b2t2   80d4 + 80d3)
First we solve rmsproblems:
For rm A,
max A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA
qA
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s.t. qA > 0
eA 2 (0; 1)
And for rm B,
max B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB,  2 (0; 1)
qB
s.t. qB > 0
eB 2 (0; 1)
We get qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB). It is not surprising that they are not
equal since rms are heterogeneous. Similar as case in 2.3.1,we plug them
into governmentswelfare functions (5), (6) to get ei , then we plug e

i into





We put the solutions in the table 2.2:
Heterogeneous rms with lo-
cal pollution
rm A & country A rm B & country B
ei e

A = [4d(a   2c + c  
d) (9bt  8d2)   16d3(a  
2c+c d)]=(9bt 4d2)(9bt 
12d2)
eB = [4d(a   2c + c  
d) (9bt  8d2) 16d3(a 2c+




A = [(a   2c + c   d) +
d(2eA   eB)]=3b



















W B = 

B   te2B =2
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Table 2.2 Solution for heterogeneous rms under local pollution
Table 2.2 shows governmental policies, outputs, rmsprots and govern-
mentswelfare in the case of heterogeneous rms under local pollution.
2.2.3.3 Heterogeneous rms under transboundary pollution
We have functions (3), (4), (7), (8) for two heterogeneous rms with
transboundary pollution.
Assumption 2.3: To make our solutions are interior, we set restrictions
for parameter:
a  c  d > 0
9bt > 4d2
9bt > 2d(a  c)
1 >  > 0
 > [9bt(c  2d) + 4d2(a  c)]=9bct
 > [9bct  4d2(a  d)]=c(9bt  4d2)
The rst step is similar as that in 2.3.2 and we have rm As and rm Bs
best reaction functions. We plug them into governmentswelfare functions







We show the solutions in the table 2.3 below:
Heterogeneous rms with
transnational pollution
rm A & country A rm B & country B
ei e

A = 4d(a   c   d)=(18bt  
4d2) + 9bct(1   )=d(18bt  
4d2)
eB = 4d(a c  d)=(18bt 




A = 3t(2a   c   c  
2d)=(18bt  4d2)





2(2a   c   c  
2d)2=(18bt  4d2)2
B = 9bt




A = t(9bt   8d2)(2a   c  
c  2d)2=(18bt  4d2)2
W B = t(9bt   8d2)(2a   c  
c  2d)2=(18bt  4d2)2
Table 2.3 Solution for heterogeneous rms under transboundary pollution
Table 2.3 shows governmental policies, outputs, rmsprots and gov-
ernmentswelfare in the case of heterogeneous rms under transboundary
pollution.
2.3 Results
After comparing the solutions in di¤erent cases, we nd some results
about governments and rms.














The intuitive explanation behind this proposition is that if rmspro-
duction cost are equal, governments and rms under local pollution are in
a better position than those under transboundary pollution. Under local
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pollution, pollution from abroad does not a¤ect the home country, so gov-
ernments would make less stringent environmental policies to help domestic
rms to get more prots. Since domestic rmsincreasing prots are more
than countriesincreasing pollution, countrieswelfare under local pollution
are higher than those under transboundary pollution. Firmstotal costs are
lower under local pollution because of their lower environmental abatement
costs. Thus rmsoutputs and prots become more.
We illustrate this result by using a numerical example. We assume a = 5,
b = 4, c = 2, d = 1 and t = 0:5, which satisfy all the restrictions. Then we
have solutions:
e;li = 0:57 > e
;t
i = 0:25; i = fA;Bg, which implies governmental environ-
mental policy is less strict in local pollution than in transboundary pollution.
q;li = 0:214 > q
;t
i = 0:188; i = fA;Bg, which implies rms produce more
in local pollution than they produce in transboundary pollution.
;li = 0:184 > 
;t
i = 0:141; i = fA;Bg, which implies rms get more
prots in local pollution than they get in transboundary pollution.
W ;li = 0:102 > W
;t
i = 0:078; i = fA;Bg,which implies countrieswelfare
are higher in local pollution than in transboundary pollution.














Proposition 2.2 implies that under local pollution, the country whose
domestic rm has the cost advantage of production has a higher tolerance for
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the pollution, since its rms increasing prots are higher than the costs of the
increasing pollution. Thus the government would impose a relatively loose
environmental policy on its rm which benets from both the advantage of
production and the advantage of abatement. As a result, the rm produces a
higher quantity of the products and obtains more prots than its competitor.
Its country has higher welfare than its competitors country.
We use another numerical example with same data to observe govern-
ments (gure 1,4) and rms (gure 2,3).
In Figure 1, X-axis is "" which reects the heterogeneity of production
costs between rms.  2 (0:813; 1) for solutions are interior. The heterogene-
ity increases as  decreases. Y-axis represents governmental environmental
policies. The solid line is for government A and the dotted line is for gov-
ernment B. We observe that e;lA is always smaller than e
;l
B , which means
government B applies a less strict environmental policy than government A.
As  decreases, the heterogeneity increases and the gap between e;lA and e
;l
B
increases. This trend of the gap shows that government A tends to make
a more stringent environmental policy while government B tends to make a
looser policy. The rst policy imposes a higher abatement cost on rm A
while the latter policy imposed a lower abatement cost on rm B.
In gure 2, X-axis is "" and Y-axis represents rmsoutputs. The solid
line is q;lA which is higher than the dotted line which reects q
;l
B . As 
decreases, rm Bs advantage in production cost increases. Meanwhile its
advantage in environmental abatement cost also increases due to a looser
environmental policy. Thus the gap between q;lA and q
;l
B increases, which










Figure 2. Firmsoutputs under local pollution in heterogeneous case
In gure 3, X-axis is "" and Y-axis represents rmsprots. Firm As
prot ;lA (solid curve) is less than rm Bs prots 
;l
B (dotted curve) and
their gap increases as  decreases.
In gure 4, X-axis is "" and Y-axis represents countrieswelfare. Coun-








Figure 3. Firmsprots under local pollution in heterogeneous case
W A:solid curve; W

B: dotted curve.
Figure 4. Countrieswelfare under local pollution in heterogeneous case
















Propositions 2.3 suggests that the rm with lower production cost would
su¤er from a more strict governmental environmental policy than its competi-
tor under transboundary pollution. Such a policy increases its environmental
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abatement cost and o¤sets its advantage in production cost. Thus its output
and prot are equal as those of its competitor. The welfare of the two coun-
tries are also equal. Figures 5,6,7,8 show how governments and heterogeneous








B: dotted line (coincide).
Figure 6. Firmsoutputs under transboundary pollution in heterogeneous
case
In Figure 5, X-axis is "" which reects the heterogeneity of production
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costs between rms.  2 (0:813; 1) for solutions are interior. The heterogene-
ity increases as  decreases. Y-axis represents governmental environmental
policies. The solid line is for government A and the dotted line is for gov-
ernment B. We observe that e;lA is always higher than e
;l
B , which means
government A applies a less strict environmental policy than government B.
This is completely opposite of the result in Figure 1.
A:solid curve; 

B: dotted curve (coincide)
Figure 7. Firmsprots under transboundary pollution in heterogeneous
case
W A:solid curve; W

B: dotted curve (coincide)
Figure 8. Countrieswelfare under transboundary pollution in heteroge-
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neous case
In Figure 6, X-axis is "" and Y-axis represents rmsoutputs. The solid
line is q;tA overlaps the solid line which reects q
;t
B . As  decreases, rm
Bs production cost decreases. However, as Government Bs environmental
policy becomes stricter and stricter, rm Bs environmental abatement cost
increases by a same amount of its decreasing production cost. Consequently,
rm Bs output remains equal as that of rm A.
In Figure 7, X-axis is "" and Y-axis represents rmsprots. The solid
curve is ;tA overlaps the dotted curve which reects 
;t
B . Since rmsoutputs
and total costs are same, their prots remain equal as them in homogeneous
cases.
In Figure 8, X-axis is "" and Y-axis represents countrieswelfare. Coun-
try As welfareW ;tA (solid curve) is equal to country Bs welfare W
;t
B (dotted
curve). The reason is that both their domestic rmsprots and the social
environmental damages in their countries are same regardless of the change
of "".
The intuition for Proposition 2.3 is that when pollution is transboundary,
both countries face the same loss from pollution. We view such loss as a
function of the sum of emissions from each country, then they must face the
same marginal loss. Meanwhile the optimal condition says that each country
must also be facing the same marginal prot from emission in equilibrium,
which, upon examination of the Cournot prots, is a linear function of a
countrys own equilibrium production quantity, common to both countries.
This implies that both countries must produce the same quantity of the
good, which in turn implies the environmental policies by the two countries
must completely o¤set the disadvantage in production cost. The equalization
results in prots and welfare then follow.
2.4 Conclusion
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This paper discusses how governments make environmental policies un-
der di¤erent types of pollution. They choose more stringent policies under
transboundary pollution than those they choose under local pollution. When
rms are homogeneous in production cost, both rms and governments are
better o¤ under local pollution.
When rms are heterogeneous in production cost, the results are di¤erent.
Under local pollution, the government chooses a looser environmental policy
if its domestic rm has lower production cost than the foreign rm. The
country with the cost advantage benets more from prots generated by the
industry since it is in a better competitive position than the other country,
so has a relatively higher tolerance for the resulting pollution. Industry
prots are higher in the country with cost advantage both because of lower
costs of production and because of lower costs of abatement due to laxer
environmental policy. The larger negative e¤ect of pollution is not enough
to o¤set the gain in industry prots. In stark contrast, we nd that the cost
advantage in production does not matter under transboundary pollution.
The country with the cost advantage now sets a more stringent environmental
policy and hence higher cost of abatement which completely o¤sets the cost
advantage of production. Thus, rmsprots are equal, as well as countries
welfare. A more stringent environmental policy imposed on the rm with
lower production cost implies that such policy under transboundary pollution
would discourage he rmincentive to decrease its production cost, since the
increasing benets from the decrease of its production cost will be shared
with the other rm which benets from a looser environmental policy. In
general, we conclude that the governmental environmental policies under
local pollution stimulate rms to decrease their production costs while such




Impacts of Governmental Environmental
Policies on rms in the Stackelberg
Competition
3.1. Introduction
The Stackelberg competition is a kind of competition in the market in
which the leader rm moves rst and then the follower rms move sequen-
tially. There are some constrains upon the existence of a Stackelberg equi-
librium. The leader must know ex ante that he follower observes its action.
The follower must have no means of committing to a future non-Stackelberg
follower action and the leader must know this. Barrett (1994) discusses
the interaction between governmental environmental policy and Stackelberg
competition among rms. He states that the government has no incentive to
make a weak environmental policy if its domestic rm is Stackelberg leader.
Ferreira (2012) nds that governments have incentives to raise environmental
taxes under mixed Stackelberg duopoly where two rms compete.
In a traditional Stackelberg competition where two homogeneous rms
compete on quantity, the rst move often gives the leader rm an advan-
tage in output and prot. Thus both rms have incentives to engage in
Stackelberg competition and play as the leader. However, if governmental
environmental policies are involved, rmscompetition becomes complicated.
29
It is uncertain that the leader rm could have an advantage in the Stackel-
berg competition due to two reasons. First, the rm needs consider whether
it would su¤er a more stringent environmental policy than that it has in
Cournot competition. Such policy may o¤set the advantage it has as the
Stackelberg leader. Second, the follower rm may benet from a looser en-
vironmental policy from its government. Thus the rst move would bring
disadvantage rather than advantage in environmental abatement cost. Con-
sequently, before reacting as the rst mover, each rm would calculate the
prots it could get and compare it with the prots it could get in the Cournot
competition. Certainly, the rm prefer to choose the type of competition
which could bring it more prots.
As the model in Chapter 2, the model employed in this chapter is a
two-staged game involving two governments and their two domestic rms.
Firms sell the same products and compete in the imperfectly competitive
international market. Pollution is local or transboundary. Governments
move rst by making environmental policies for their domestic rms. Firms
take these policies as given and compete by choosing their output levels.
Each rm may choose to decide its output before its competitor or decide it
at the same time with its competitor. Governments know that there are two
possibilities for their rmsoutputs (outputs under Stackelberg competition
and those under Cournot competition), thus they may make corresponding
policies based on di¤erent outputs.
It is assumed that other countries, whether or not they are consumer
countries, have no means of inuencing environmental policies in these two
producer countries.
3.2. Model under local pollution
We assume that there exist only two countries A;B and let WA and WB
be the benets of countries A;B. There exists one domestic rm i in the
30
country i; i = fA;Bg. We denote them rm A which is the leader rm and
rm B which is the follower rm in the international market. Denote the
prot of rm A by A and the prot of rm B by B. Assuming that each
rms production cost per unit is c. Firm is abatement cost depends on
the output qi and the domestic emission standard ei as environmental policy
(1 > ei > 0), which is set by government i. In the model, governments
choose environmental policies ei in the rst stage and rms choose output
levels qi in the second stage (qi > 0). Firms consider only their prots i
while governments take account into their domestic rmsprots and social
environmental damage in their countries. Pollution is purely local.
3.2.1 Firmsprots
Firms care only about their own prots without caring the social envi-
ronmental damage. However, they should consider the environmental poli-
cies from their governments which will a¤ect their environmental abatement
costs.
Firmsprot functions are as below:
Firm A: A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA
Firm B: B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB
ei 2 (0; 1); qi > 0
a; b; c; d are positive parameters. Firm is prot is its total revenue [a  
b(qA + qB)]qi minus its cost which is composed of total production cost cqi
and total environmental abatement cost d(1  ei)qi.
3.2.2 Governmentswelfare
Each government considers both its domestic rms prot and the social
environmental damage due to the rms production. Government i controls
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rm is output and pollution by making environmental policy ei which can
a¤ect rm is environmental abatement cost.
Governmentswelfare functions are:
Government A: WA = A   ( t2)e2A
Government B: WB = B   ( t2)e2B
ei 2 (0; 1); i 2 fA;Bg:
t is positive parameter which reects the degree of social environmental
damage. Government is welfare equals to its domestic rms prot i minus
the social environmental damage ( t
2
)e2i in the country. In the welfare function,
rm is output qi and relevant pollution are internalized in the governmental
environmental policy ei.
3.2.3 Solution
Before computing the solution, we need some assumption for the model.
Assumption 3.1: To make our solutions are interior(1 > ei > 0; q

i >
0;for i 2 A;B), we set restrictions for parameter:
a  c  d > 0
d2 2 (0:667bt; 0:889bt)
3d(a  c  d)(18d4   25btd2 + 8b2t2) > (6d4   17btd2 + 8b2t2)(8bt  9d2)
First, we solve rm Bproblem:
max B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB
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qB
s.t. qi > 0; i 2 fA;Bg
ei 2 (0; 1)
We get qB(qA;eA; eB) and plug it into rm As prot function and solve
rm As problem:
max A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA
qA
s.t. qi > 0; i 2 fA;Bg
ei 2 (0; 1)
Then we get qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB). Put them into governmentswel-
fare functions to solve their problems:
max Wi = fa  b[qA(eA; eB)+ qB(eA; eB)]gqi (eA; eB)  cqi (eA; eB) d(1 
ei)q

i (eA; eB)  t2e2i
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1), for i 2 A;B






i : We show them in the table 3.1 below:














8b2t2 17bd2t+6d4 (a  c  d) qB = 2t bt 2d
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Table 3.1 Solution for rms in Stackelberg competition under local pollution
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Table 3.1 shows governmental policies, outputs, rmsprots and gov-
ernmentswelfare in the case of rms in Stackelberg competition under local
pollution.
3.3. Results






























Proposition 3.1 shows that government A tends to make a more stringent
environmental policy than Government B if it thinks that its domestic rm A
will plays Stackelberg as a quantity leader. The reason is that if two rms face
a same environmental policy, rm A will produce more than rm B. It implies
that country A will su¤er from a higher social environmental damage than
country B due to a higher output. To avoid this consequence, government
A makes a more stringent environmental policy before rm As activity to
raise rm As environmental abatement cost. Since its cost increases, rm A
has to decrease its output and its prot becomes less. Thus, in Stackelberg
equilibrium, both outputs and prot of rm A are lower than those of rm
B. By limiting rm As output, government A obtains the optimal benet for
its country. Whether country As welfare is higher than country Bs welfare
depends on the values of parameters b, d, t.
Example: let a = 4; b = 5; c = 2; d = 1; t = 0:25 which satisfy all the

































Chapter 2 shows that when two homogeneous rms plays Cournot in






and their countrieswelfare are:





While a  c  d > 0, a  c  2d and 9bt > 8d2 hold.
We can compare these outcomes with rmsprots ;SA , 
;S
B and coun-
trieswelfare W ;SA , W
;S
B in Stackelberg competition.













































Proposition 3.2 shows that both rms prefers play Cournot to play as
Stackelberg leader, because the prots they get by playing as Stackelberg
leader are less than what they can get from Cournot competition. Firms suf-
fer from a more stringent governmental environmental policy if they produce
before their competitors in stead of producing simultaneously with them.
Thus, even they may have a higher output as Stackelberg leader, they still
get less prot than they can get in Cournot competition. Governments ob-
tain higher welfare if their rms play Cournot rather than play Stackelberg.
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Governments tend to make relatively stringent environmental policies to dis-
courage rms to play Stackelberg.





= 0:8181 > e;CA = e
;C





















= 0:1364 > q;CB = 0:1034




B = 0:0535 > 
;S
A = 0:0207
W ;CA = 0:1121 > W
;S
A = 0:0041
W ;CB = 0:1121 > W
;S
B = 0:0093
3.4 Model under transboundary pollution
Now we discuss a model under transboundary pollution. In this case,
rmsprot functions are same as those in the model under local pollution.
Firm A is Stackelberg leader and rm B is follower. However, for countries,
their welfare are a¤ected by pollution not only from domestic rm but also
from foreign rm. It means that the pollution generated in one country would
bring the equal social environmental damage to the other country.
The model is as below:
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Firm A: A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA
Firm B: B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB
Government A: WA = A   t2(eA + eB)2
Government B: WB = B   t2(eA + eB)2
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1); qi > 0; i = A;B:
Assumption 3.2: To make our solutions are interior(1 > ei > 0; q

i >
0;for i 2 A;B), we set restrictions for parameter:
a  c  d > 0







 4b2t2 + 24bd2t  6d4 > d(a  c  d)(6d2 + bt)
Similar as under local pollution, we rstly solve rm Bproblem:
max B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB
qB
s.t. qi > 0; i 2 fA;Bg
ei 2 (0; 1)
We get qB(qA;eA; eB) and plug it into rm As prot function and solve
rm As problem:
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max A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA
qA
s.t. qi > 0; i 2 fA;Bg
ei 2 (0; 1)
Then we get qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB). Put them into governmentswel-
fare functions which are di¤erent from those under local pollution, then we
solve their problems:
max Wi = fa  b[qA(eA; eB)+ qB(eA; eB)]gqi (eA; eB)  cqi (eA; eB) d(1 
ei)q

i (eA; eB)  t2(eA + eB)2
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1), for i 2 A;B






i : We show them in the table 3.2 below:





































Table 3.2 Solution for rms in Stackelberg competition under
transboundary pollution
Table 3.2 shows governmental policies, outputs, rmsprots and govern-
mentswelfare in the case of rms in Stackelberg competition under trans-
boundary pollution.
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3.5 Results in the model under transboundary pollution











bt); qA < q

B if
d2 2 ( 5
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Proposition 3.3 shows a similar result as that in Proposition 1. With
transboundary pollution, leading rm su¤ers from a more stringent envi-
ronmental policy from its government. Thus, it gets less prot than its
competitor even when it produce more than its competitor. Its government
makes such stringent environmental policy to discourage it to play Stackel-
berg competition because the government gets lower welfare than the other
government in such case.
We use the same date in 3.3 for a numerical example.
Example: a = 4; b = 5; c = 2; d = 1; t = 0:25:
eA = 0:162 < 0:408 = e

B
qA = 0:092 < 0:095 = q

B
A = 0:021 < 0:045 = 

B
W A =  0:0196 < 0:0044 = W B
We can also compare these results with those when rms plays Cournot
competition.
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Proposition 3.4 shows that no rm has incentive to play as Stackelberg
leader. In stead, both of them tend to play Cournot. If they produce before
their competitor, they would su¤er a higher environmental policy and get less
prot than what they can get from Cournot competition. The government
make stringent policy to push its domestic rm to play Cournot since the
government can also obtain higher welfare if its rm plays Cournot.
Example: a = 4; b = 5; c = 2; d = 1; t = 0:25:
e;CA = 0:216 > 0:162 = e
;S
A
e;CB = 0:216 < 0:408 = e
;S
B
;CA = 0:033 > 0:021 = 
;S
A
;CB = 0:033 < 0:045 = 
;S
B
W ;CA = 0:023 <  0:0196 = W ;SA
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the impacts of governmental environmental poli-
cies on rms in Stackelberg competition. Firm would face a more stringent
environmental policy from its government if it plays as Stackelberg leader.
Meanwhile, its competitor as the follower could benet from a looser envi-
ronmental policy from its government. Governments make di¤erent policies
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for the same reason: balance the domestic rms prot and the social envi-
ronmental damage in the country. If one rm moves rstly, its output would
signicantly increase if there is no intervention from governmental policy.
Thus, the pollution from its production would also sharply increase. To
avoid the increasing pollution, its government tends to make more stringent
environmental policy to discourage its choice to play as the leader. Mean-
while, if one rm moves secondly, its output would signicantly decrease if
there is no intervention from governmental policy. The pollution from its
production would also sharply decrease. To keep the pollution decrease, its
government tends to make looser environmental policy to courage its choice
to play as the follower.
Therefore, no rm has incentive to play as leader since the leader would
get less prot than the follower due to the di¤erent governmental environ-
mental policies on them. In stead, they tend to play Cournot from which
they obtain more prots and their governments obtain higher welfare than
what they could get from Stackelberg competition. These results are same






In Chapter 2 and 3, rms independently decide their outputs and govern-
ments independently make their environmental policies. In this Chapter, we
discuss the possibilities for collusion. Collusion is an agreement between two
or more parties to limit open competition or to obtain a common objective.
Within the environmental economics literature, the study of collusion sta-
bility has so far been restricted to international environmental agreements
(IEAs), where countries collude to reduce emissions together (See Barrett
(2003) and Finus (2003)). Governments could choose collude to make same
environmental policies while rms could choose to collude to decide their out-
puts together. Governments and rms can also keep reacting independently
as they do in Chapter 2 and 3.
Before making decision on collusion, governments and rms would con-
sider all the choices and their correspondent payo¤s. Their objectives are
always to maximize their payo¤s.
In a typical competition without governments, rms would obtain more
prots from their collusion than what they could get in the Cournot com-
petition. However, if governmental environmental policies are involved, the
result could be di¤erent. As we show in Chapter 3, the rm gets less prots as
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the leader in the Stackelberg competition than in the Cournot competition.
Here the case is similar. If rms collude, their governments may impose more
stringent environmental policies on them. Thus, their environmental abate-
ment costs would increase and the collusion might not be a suitable choice
for them. Besides, governments may collude too. Governmentsdecision on
their collusion would also a¤ect rmschoice.
As the model in Chapter 2 and 3, the model employed in this chapter is
a two-staged game involving two governments and their two domestic rms.
Firms sell the same products and compete in the imperfectly competitive in-
ternational market. Pollution is local or transboundary. Governments move
rst by making environmental policies for their domestic rms. Firms take
these policies as given and compete by choosing their output levels. In the
rst stage, each government may choose to independently make its environ-
mental policy or make it together with the other government. In the second
stage, each rm may choose to independently decide its output or decide it
together with its competitor by cooperation. Governments know that there
are two possibilities for their rmsoutputs (outputs in the Cournot compe-
tition and those in rmscooperation), thus they may choose to cooperate
or not based on di¤erent outputs. Consequently, we have four possibilities of
choices to analyze. We will compare the payo¤s of governments and rms in
all the four cases and get their preference for choice.
As in Chapter 2 and 3, it is assumed that other countries, whether or not
they are consumer countries, have no means of inuencing environmental
policies in these two producer countries.
4.2 Model under local pollution
There are two countries (governments) A and B where rm A is the only
domestic rm in country A and rm B is the only domestic rm in country
B. In the rst step, Governments make environmental policies to pursue
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maximum countrieswelfare which is the domestic rms prot minus the
pollution in the country. In the second step, rms compete in the market
(no other rms) to pursue maximum rmsprot. Government can make the
environmental policy independently or cooperate with the other government
to make the policy together. Firm can decide its output independently or
cooperate with the other rm to decide the output together. As it is a
symmetric model, governments always obtain the same welfare and rms
always obtain the same prot. Thus, we can think it as a game with two
players, government and rm. Since government makes its policy before rm
decides its output, it is a sequential game. We assume that any cheating
activity is observable which is not considered in the model.
In this sequential game, there are four cases. In case 1, governments
make environmental policies independently then rms also play indepen-
dently (Cournot). In case 2, governments make policies by collusion and
rms play Cournot. In case 3, governments make policies independently and
rms decide output by collusion. In case 4, both governments and rms make
decisions by collusion. Case 1 is discussed in Chapter 2. In this Chapter, we
derive the other three cases and discuss them with case 1.
The rmsprot functions and the governmentswelfare functions are as
below:
Firm A: A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA
Firm B: B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB
Government A: WA = A   t2e2A
Government B: WB = B   t2e2B
ei 2 (0; 1); i = A;B:
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Before computing the solution, we need some assumption for the cases
under local pollution.
Assumption 4.1: To make our solutions are interior(1 > ei > 0; q

i >
0; i > 0 and W

i > 0 for i 2 A;B), we set restrictions for parameter:
a  c  d > 0




4.2.1 Governmentscollusion without rmscollusion
First, we solve rm is problem:
max i = [a  b(qA + qB)]qi   cqi   d(1  ei)qi
qi
s.t. qi > 0; i 2 fA;Bg
ei 2 (0; 1)
Then we get qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB). Put them into governmentswel-
fare functions to solve their problems:
max W = WA + WB = fa   b[qA(eA; eB) + qB(eA; eB)]gqi (eA; eB)  
cqi (eA; eB)  d(1  ei)qi (eA; eB)  t2e2i
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1), for i 2 A;B








4.2.2 Firmscollusion without governmentscollusion
First, rm A and B cooperate. Their total prots function is:
 = A + B
We solve their problem as below:
Max  = A + B = [a   b(qA + qB)](qA + qB)   (c + d)(qA + qB) +
d(eAqA + eBqB)
Then we get qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB). Put them into government As
and Bs welfare functions to solve their problems:







4.2.3 Collusion for both governments and rms
First, rm A and B cooperate. They solve the problem of total prot as
in 4.2.2:
Max  = A + B = [a   b(qA + qB)](qA + qB)   (c + d)(qA + qB) +
d(eAqA + eBqB)
Then we get qA(eA; eB) and q

B(eA; eB). Put them into governmentstotal
welfare function to solve their problems.





























4.2.4 Comparison among di¤erent cases
We show all the solution of di¤erent cases in the tables below:
Cases governmental policy rms output




























Table 4.1: Governments policy and rms output under local pollution
Table 4.1 shows di¤erent governmental environmental policies and rms
outputs based on di¤erent decisions from governments and rms. These poli-
cies and outputs would cause di¤erent prots for rms and di¤erent welfare
for governments.
Cases rms prot governments welfare




























Table 4.2: Governments welfare and rms prot under local pollution
Table 4.2 shows di¤erent prots for rms and di¤erent welfare for gov-
ernments. Both rms and governments would compare their payo¤s among
di¤erent cases and nd the best way to maximize their payo¤s.
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4.3. Results in the model under local pollution
From the comparison among di¤erent cases, we nd some interesting
results related to governmentsand rmspayo¤s and preference.















Proposition 4.1 shows that if governments cooperate, they always make
more stringent environmental policies than those they make independently,
regardless of rmsbehaviors. The main reason is that with collusion gov-
ernment considers not only the pollution in its own country but also that in
the other country. Thus governments tend to make more stringent policies
to control the whole pollution.
Firms always make higher outputs when they play Cournot than when
they cooperate. The reason is that rmsoutputs are supposed to be higher
by collusion than those under Cournot competition if the costs are same.
Higher outputs imply more pollution, thus governments make more strin-
gent environmental policies if they think rms would not cooperate. The
objective of such policies is to obtain countriesmaximum welfare by balanc-
ing rmsprots and relevant pollution. As environmental policies become
more stringent, rmsenvironmental abatement costs become higher. Thus
rms have to lower their output by collusion to maintain their optimal prot.













W G > W

nc:
Proposition 4.2 shows that rms prefer to cooperate than compete Cournot
since they can obtain higher prot in the rst case. This is same as the typ-
ical model in which rmsprot are always higher by collusion than those
by Cournot. The di¤erence is governmentsintervention. Firms face higher
costs from more stringent governmental environmental policies if they decide
their outputs independently. The reason is that their outputs in the Cournot
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competition are higher than those in collusion and more outputs mean more
pollution which stimulate governments to make more strict environmental
policies. The best outcome for governments is that both governments and
rms cooperate while the worst case for them is that neither governments
nor rms cooperate. Governmentscollusion implies that stringent policies
make pollution signicantly decrease and rmscollusion implies that rms
maintain their prot at a certain level. Thus governments can obtain the
maximum welfare meanwhile rms can avoid the worst outcome for them.
Proposition 4.2 implies that governments can get their best outcome since
they are the player who plays rst in this sequential game. Once they choose
to cooperate, rms have to choose cooperate too. Firmsbest outcome is
that neither governments nor rms cooperate. However, as the following
player, rms have to wait governments to choose rstly and governments
would choose cooperate. Thus rms never have chance to reach their best
outcome.
4.4. Model under transboundary pollution
The rmsprot functions are same as those under local pollution. The
governmentswelfare functions are di¤erent from those under local pollution
since the pollution in the foreign country would also a¤ect the home country
under transboundary pollution. Their functions are as below.
Firm A: A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA
Firm B: B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB
Government A: WA = A   t2(eA + eB)2
Government B: WB = B   t2(eA + eB)2
ei 2 (0; 1); i = A;B:
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Before computing the solution, we need some assumption for the cases
under transboundary pollution.
Assumption 4.2: To make our solutions are interior(1 > ei > 0; q

i >
0; i > 0 and W

i > 0 for i 2 A;B), we set restrictions for parameter:
a  c  d > 0




The computation is similar as those under local pollution. We get the
solutions from di¤erent cases and show them in the tables below.
Cases governmental policy rms output




























Table 4.3: Governments policy and rms output under transboundary
pollution
Table 4.3 shows governmental environmental policies and rmsoutputs
based on di¤erent decisions from governments and rms under transboundary
pollution. These policies and outputs would cause di¤erent prots for rms
and di¤erent welfare for governments.
Cases rms prot governments welfare





























Table 4.4: Governments welfare and rms policy under transboundary
pollution
Table 4.4 shows di¤erent prots for rms and di¤erent welfare for govern-
ments under transboundary pollution. Both rms and governments would
compare their payo¤s among di¤erent cases and nd the best way to maxi-
mize their payo¤s.
4.5 Results in the model under transboundary pollution
From the comparison among di¤erent cases, we nd the orders of results
from di¤erent cases are similar as those under local pollution. There are
some di¤erence in rmsprots and countrieswelfare, but they would not
a¤ect rmsor governmentschoices.















Proposition 4.3 shows that the orders of governmental environmental poli-
cies and rmsoutputs among di¤erent cases under transboundary pollution
are same as those under local pollution. In general, governments tend to
make more stringent environmental policies if they choose collude rather than
decide independently, since they should consider the pollution in the other
country when they collude. Another issue which a¤ects governmental envi-
ronmental policies is rmsoutputs. If rms produce more, it means that
the pollution increase correspondingly. In that case, governments tend to
make more stringent environmental policies to discourage rmsproduction
and relevant pollution.
Since rms produce more under Cournot competition than what they
produce by collusion, they would su¤er more stringent environmental poli-
cies under Cournot competition if governments collude. Thus, rms would
consider to collude and decrease their outputs. Lower outputs do not mean
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less prots for rms. First, lower outputs raise the price in the market. Sec-
ond, lower outputs generate less pollution, then governments may make looser
environmental policies to decrease rmsenvironmental abatement costs.















and W GF > W

F :
Proposition 4.4 implies that rms prefer collude than react independently,
as their prots are higher in the rst case. Besides, they dont welcome
governmentscollusion which would increase their environmental abatement
costs and decrease their prots. For example, if governments choose collude
in the rst stage, rms could produce more if they decide their outputs inde-
pendently. But if they do so, they can not obtain more prots. In stead, their
prots decrease due to more stringent governmental environmental polices.
Consequently, governmentscollusion may discourage rms to increase their
outputs.
Governments also prefer collude than decide independently for higher
welfare. The di¤erence is that for rms, they like collusion but they dont
like governments collude while for governments, they like not only collusion
between themselves but also collusion between rms.
Proposition 4.4 also shows that under transboundary pollution, both gov-
ernments and rms have same preference as what they have under local
pollution. In the rst stage, governments choose to collude for making envi-
ronmental policies. In the second stage, rms choose to collude for deciding
their outputs. Proposition 4 implies that the type of pollution (local or
transboundary) would not a¤ect governmentsand rmschoices.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the di¤erent payo¤s of governments and rms when
they make di¤erent choices for collusion. We nd that governments can ob-
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tain maximum welfare if they collude and their domestic rms collude. Al-
though rms can not maximize their prots in this case, they can accept it
since they would have the least prots if they reject it. Firms could get more
prots if governments dont choose collude. But it is impossible for govern-
ments not to choose collude in the rst stage. As the second player, rms
have to make their decision under governmentscollusion in environmental
policies.
In the rst stage, governments choose collude and make relatively strict
environmental policies. In the second stage, rms choose collude to main-
tain their outputs at a certain level and avoid the most strict environmental
policy. Thus, rmscollusion can recover some loss of their prots due to
the increasing environmental abatement costs. Finally, by collusion, gov-
ernments can get their maximum welfare while rms can obtain acceptable
prots which are neither the most nor the least.
The results in this chapter advocate both governments and rms to col-
lude. By such collusion, the pollution is controlled at a relatively low level




After discussing governmentswelfare and rmsprots in di¤erent types
of competition (Cournot, Stackelberg and Collusion) and under di¤erent
types of pollution (pure local or transboundary), we can make some con-
clusion in this chapter.
First, under the circumstance that both governments and rms make
their decisions independently, rms which are homogeneous in costs have no
incentives to decide their outputs and produce before their competitors. In
stead, they prefer produce at the same time. This is di¤erent than what we
know that one rm can obtain more prots as a leader in Stackelberg com-
petition than as a player in Cournot competition. The reason is that when
governments and environment issues are involved, the rm as a Stackelberg
leader would su¤er from a more stringent governmental environmental policy
than what it has in Cournot competition. Such policy raises its environmen-
tal abatement cost and decreases its prots, thus the rm has no incentive
to act as the rst mover.
Second, once rms choose compete Cournot in the market, the types of
pollution would a¤ect their incentives to make e¤orts on decreasing their pro-
duction costs. Under local pollution, if one rms production cost decreases,
the rm would benet from a looser environmental policy from its govern-
ment and its competitor would su¤er from a more stringent governmental
environmental policy. Then the rm would obtain more prots than what it
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can get without governmentsintervention. So rms have strong incentives to
decrease their production costs under local pollution. However, under trans-
boundary pollution, the decrease of one rms production cost would make
the rm su¤er from a more strict environmental policy from its government
but its competitor would benet from a looser governmental environmental
policy. Then, the rms advantage in production costs would be o¤set by
its disadvantage in governmental environmental policies and the rm still
get same prots as its competitor which acts as a free rider. Consequently,
rms have no incentive to make e¤orts on decreasing their production costs
under transboundary pollution. As the decrease of production cost reect a
technology progress, the result implies that transboundary pollution could
be a barrier for technology improvement.
Finally, if governments and rms are free to choose collusion, the types
of pollution (local or transboundary) would not a¤ect governmentsor rms
choices. Governments certainly choose to cooperate with each other in mak-
ing their environmental policies. It means that when one government make
its policy, it not only consider its domestic rms prots and the pollution in
its country but also consider the foreign rms prots and the pollution in
the other country. Based on these policies, rms would also choose to collude
in deciding their total outputs. As a result, collusion is the best choice for
both governments and rms. From collusion, governments can obtain their
maximum welfare and rms can obtain medium prots.
Discussion in this paper is limited to two countries and two rms. More
complicated cases that include more countries and rms remain to be discov-
ered in future research. Besides, the results in this paper are based on the
assumption that solutions are interior. The cases for corner solutions is to
be discussed in the later study. Moreover, we need more empirical evidence
to support the results in this paper.
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Appendix A: Government policies and rms under Cournot
competition
A.1 Computation for solutions
We show the computations for solutions from di¤erent cases.
(1) Homogeneous rms with local pollution
First, we solve rmsproblems:
max i = [a  b(qA + qB)]qi   cqi   d(1  ei)qi , for i 2 A;B
qi
s.t. qi > 0





















Then we solve governmentsproblems.
For government A, we solve:
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max WA = A   ( t2)e2A
eA
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1) for i 2 A;B
We plug (A3), (A4) into government As objective function to get:
max WA = fa   b[a c d+d(2eA eB)3b + a c d+d(2eB eA)3b ]g[a c d+d(2eA eB)3b ]  
c[a c d+d(2eA eB)
3b
]  d(1  eA)[a c d+d(2eA eB)3b ]  ( t2)e2A

















eA)  3teAd = 0
! eA = 1 9bt+8d2 (4d2eB   4ad+ 4cd+ 4d2) (A5)
Similarly, we plug (A3), (A4) into government Bs objective function to
get:
max WB = fa   b[a c d+d(2eA eB)3b + a c d+d(2eB eA)3b ]g[a c d+d(2eB eA)3b ]  
c[a c d+d(2eB eA)
3b
]  d(1  eB)[a c d+d(2eB eA)3b ]  ( t2)e2B
eB




! eB = 1 9bt+8d2 (4d2eA   4ad+ 4cd+ 4d2) (A6)











B in (A7), (A8) are optimal choices for governments A, B. We put






Plugging (A7), (A8), (A9) into (1), (2), (5), (6) in Chapter 2, we obtain











(2) Computations for homogeneous rms with transboundary
pollution
For government A, we solve:
max WA = A   ( t2)(eA + eB)2
eA
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1) for i 2 A;B
We plug (A3), (A4) into government As objective function to get:
max WA = fa   b[a c d+d(2eA eB)3b + a c d+d(2eB eA)3b ]g[a c d+d(2eA eB)3b ]  
c[a c d+d(2eA eB)
3b
]  d(1  eA)[a c d+d(2eA eB)3b ]  ( t2)(eA + eB)2


















eA)  3t(eA+eB)d = 0
! eA = 1 9bt+8d2 (4d2eB   4ad+ 4cd+ 4d2 + 9bteB) (A10)




2eA   4ad+ 4cd+ 4d2 + 9bteA) (A11)
























(3) Heterogeneous rms with local pollution
For rm A,
max A = [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA
qA
s.t. qA > 0





! qA = a c d(1 eA)2b   qB2 (A14)
For rm B,
max B = [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB   d(1  eB)qB,  2 (0; 1)
qB
s.t. qB > 0




! qB = a c d(1 eB)2b   qB2 (A15)









Then we solve governmentsproblems,
For government A, we solve:
max WA = A   ( t2)eA2
eA
s.t. eA 2 (0; 1)
We plug (A16), (A17) into government As objective function to get:
maxWA = fa b[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)3b + (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)3b ]g [(a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)]3b  
c [(a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)]
3b
  d(1  eA) [(a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)]3b   ( t2)e2A,  2 (0; 1)
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 teA = 0 (A18)
For government B, we solve:
max WB = B   ( t2)eB2
eB
s.t. eB 2 (0; 1)
We plug (A16), (A17) into government Bs objective function to get:
maxWB = fa b[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)3b + (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)3b ]g[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)3b ] 
c[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)
3b
]  d(1  eA)[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)3b ]  ( t2)e2B,  2 (0; 1)





















 teB = 0 (A19)



























Plugging (A20) - (A23) into rmsand governmentsobjective functions,
we get,
























(4) Heterogeneous rms with transboundary pollution
The rst step is similar as that in 2.3.2 and we have rm As and rm
Bs best response functions (A16), (A17).
We plug (A16), (A17) into (3), (4) in the Chapter 2 to get,
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For government A,
maxWA = fa b[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)3b + (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)3b ]g [(a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)]3b  
c [(a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)]
3b
 d(1  eA) [(a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)]3b   ( t2)(eA+ eB)2,  2
(0; 1)
s.t. eA 2 (0; 1)
For government B,
maxWB = fa b[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eA eB)3b + (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)3b ]g[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)3b ] 
c[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)
3b
]   d(1   eA)[ (a 2c+c d)+d(2eB eA)3b ]   ( t2)(eA + eB)2,
 2 (0; 1)
s.t. eB 2 (0; 1)










(18bt 4d2)   9bct(1 )d(18bt 4d2) (A25)







Plugging (A24) - (A27) into rmsprot functions and governmentswel-











A.2 Proof of Propositions
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Here we show the proofs for Propositions 2.1 - 2.3.
(1) Proof of Proposition 2.1:
Since 4d(a  c  d) > 0, 18bt  4d2 > 9bt  4d2 > 0, then
e;li = 4d(a  c  d)=(9bt  4d2) > 4d(a  c  d)=(18bt  4d2) = e;ti
q;li = 3t(a  c  d)=(9bt  4d2) = 6t(a  c  d)=(18bt  8d2) > 6t(a  c 
d)=(18bt  4d2) = q;ti
;li = 9bt
2(a  c  d)2=(9bt  4d2)2 = 36bt2(a  c  d)2=(18bt   8d2)2 >
36bt2(a  c  d)2=(18bt  4d2)2 = ;ti
W ;li = t(9bt   8d2)(a   c   d)2=(9bt   4d2)2 = 4t(9bt   8d2)(a   c  
d)2=(18bt  8d2)2 > 4t(9bt  8d2)(a  c  d)2=(9bt  4d2)2 = W ;ti
(2) Proof of Proposition 2.2:










q;lA = [(a 2c+c d)+d(2e;lA  e;lB )]=3b < [(a 2c+ c d)+d(2e;lA  




2 < b(q;lB )





W ;lB   W ;lA = ct (1  ) 9bt 8d
2
27b2t2 48bd2t+16d4 (2a  c  c  2d) = ct(1  
) 9bt 8d
2
(3bt 4d2)(9bt 4d2)(2a c c 2d). Preconditions 3bt 4d2 > 0, a c d > 0,
 2 (0; 1) ensure that ct(1   ) 9bt 8d2
(3bt 4d2)(9bt 4d2)(2a   c   c   2d) > 0, so




(3) Proof of Proposition 2.3:
e;tA   e;tB = 18bct(1 )d(18bt 4d2)   4cd(1 )(18bt 4d2) = c(1 )d > 0, so e;tA > e;tB .
Firm As total cost per product is: c+d(1  e;tA ). Firm Bs total cost per
product is: c+df1 [e;tA   c(1 )d ]g = c+d(1 e;tA )+c(1 ) = c+d(1 e;tA ).
So rm Bs total cost per product equals to that of rm A.
Since rmstotal costs per product are equal, they have same outputs
and prots.
























= W ;tB . Countrieswelfare are
equal.
Appendix B: Government policies and rms under Stackelberg
competition
B.1 Computation for solutions
Based on the fact that pollution could be local or transboundary, we
compute for di¤erent solutions.
(1) Computation under local pollution
As rm A is Stackelberg leader, we rstly solve rm Bs problem,








































































8b2t2 17bd2t+6d4 (a  c  d) (B9)
Put (B6), (B7), (B8) and (B9) in rmsprot functions and governments





























(2) Computation under transboundary pollution
First we solve rm Bs problem,








































Similarly, we put (B11), (B12) in government Bs welfare function and


























B in rmsprot functions and governments




















B.2 Proof of Propositions
73
We show proofs for Propositions 2.1 - 2.4.
(1) Proof of Proposition 2.1









d(a c d) which is negative, we have
(4bt  6d2)(8bt  9d2) and 54d4   75btd2 + 24b2t2:









(6d4 17btd2+8b2t2)(8bt 9d2) ) eA < eB
Then, we compare qA = 2t
2bt 3d2
8b2t2 17bd2t+6d4 (a  c  d) and qB =
2t bt 2d
2
8b2t2 17bd2t+6d4 (a  c  d)
Both times (6d
4 17btd2+8b2t2)
2t(a c d) which is negative, we have 2bt  3d2






8b2t2 17bd2t+6d4 (a  c  d) < 2t bt 2d
2






























) A < 12B < B















4(bt d2) (3d2   2bt)2 (8bt 9d2)(bt 2d2)2 = bt (8b2t2   23bd2t+ 16d4)


































(2) Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof: e;CA > e
;S
A , 4d(a c d)(9bt 4d2) > 2d(a c d)(2bt 3d
2)
(6d4 17btd2+8b2t2) , 2(9bt 4d2) > (3d
2 2bt)
( 6d4+17btd2 8b2t2)
, 34btd2   12d4   16b2t2 > 35btd2   12d4   18b2t2
, bt(2bt  d2) > 0, 2bt  d2 > 0




















, 3(9bt   4d2)( 18d4 + 25btd2   8b2t2) > 4( 6d4 + 17btd2  
8b2t2)(8bt  9d2)
, bt (40b2t2   61bd2t+ 18d4) > 0
, 40b2t2   61bd2t+ 18d4 > 0
40b2t2   61bd2t + 18d4 > 0 if d2 > 45
18
bt or d2 < 8
9
bt. We know




bt); so 40b2t2   61bd2t+ 18d4 > 0 holds. Thus, e;SB > e;CB :
Suppose q;CA > q
;S




8b2t2 17bd2t+6d4 , 51btd2   18d4   24b2t2 >  24d4  
36b2t2 + 70btd2
, 6d4   19btd2 + 12b2t2 > 0

















































, (4d2   2bt)(9bt  4d2) > (51btd2   18d4   24b2t2)
, 2d4   7btd2 + 6b2t2 > 0, d2(2d2   bt) + 6bt(bt  d2) > 0














(6d4 17btd2+8b2t2)2 , 9(9bt 4d2)2 <
4(bt 2d2)2
(6d4 17btd2+8b2t2)2
, 9 (6d4   17btd2 + 8b2t2)2 < 4(9bt  4d2)2(bt  2d2)2
, (18d4   51btd2 + 24b2t2)2 < (16d4   44btd2 + 18b2t2)2
, 18d4   51btd2 + 24b2t2 > 16d4   44btd2 + 18b2t2 since both
sides are negative.














(6d4 17btd2+8b2t2)2 , 9(6d4  
17btd2 + 8b2t2)2 > 2(9bt  4d2)2(2bt  3d2)2
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, (18d4   51btd2 + 24b2t2)2 > 2(12d4   35btd2 + 18b2t2)2
() 18d4   51btd2 + 24b2t2 < p2(12d4   35btd2 + 18b2t2)
Since 18d4   51btd2 + 24b2t2 < p2(12d4   35btd2 + 18b2t2)




bt);then ;CA > 
;S
A holds.
To prove W ;CA > W
;S





, (9bt   8d2) (8b2t2   17bd2t+ 6d4)2 > 2(bt   d2)( 12d4  
18b2t2 + 35btd2)2
Since 9bt  8d2 > bt  d2 > 0; we only need prove:
(8b2t2   17bd2t+ 6d4)2 > 2( 12d4   18b2t2 + 35btd2)2
, 8b2t2   17bd2t+ 6d4 < p2( 12d4   18b2t2 + 35btd2) since
both sides are negative.
3
2





2 > 0 and  12d4   18b2t2 + 35btd2 < 0
We can also get 8b2t2 17bd2t+6d4 < 3
2
( 12d4 18b2t2+35btd2)





So 8b2t2   17bd2t + 6d4 < p2( 12d4   18b2t2 + 35btd2)




To prove W ;CB > W
;S





, 2(9bt   8d2) (8b2t2   17bd2t+ 6d4)2 > (8bt  
9d2) (bt  2d2)2 (9bt  4d2)2
Since 2(9bt  8d2) > 8bt  9d2, we only need prove:
(8b2t2   17bd2t+ 6d4)2 > (bt  2d2)2 (9bt   4d2)2 =
(8d4   22btd2 + 9b2t2)2
() 8b2t2  17bd2t+6d4 < 8d4  22btd2+9b2t2 since both
sides are negative
() 14d4   39btd2 + 17b2t2 < 0





we get W ;CB > W
;S
B :
(3) Proof of Proposition 2.3




 4b2t2+24bd2t 6d4 , 12d2 5bt <
2(6d2 + bt)



























2 (8d2   bt)2] < 0
so A < 

B






A  t2(eA+eB)2 < W B = B  t2(eA+eB)2
holds.
(4) Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof: Preconditions for cournot model with transboundary pollution:
d2 < 9
8







A , 4d(a c d)(18bt 4d2) > d(a c d)(12d
2 5bt)
2( 4b2t2+24bd2t 6d4) , 8( 4b2t2+24bd2t 
6d4) > (18bt  4d2)(12d2   5bt)
, 8( 4b2t2+24bd2t  6d4) > (18bt  4d2)(12d2  5bt) holds when







B , 4d(a c d)(18bt 4d2) < d(a c d)(6d
2+bt)
 4b2t2+24bd2t 6d4 , 4( 4b2t2+24bd2t 
6d4) < (18bt  4d2)(6d2 + bt)
, 4( 4b2t2 + 24bd2t  6d4) < (18bt  4d2)(6d2 + bt) holds when






q;CA   q;SA = 6t(a c d)(18bt 4d2)   t(9d
2 2bt)(a c d)
( 4b2t2+24bd2t 6d4) . Its sign is uncertain
q;CB < q
;S
B , 6t(a c d)(18bt 4d2) < t(8d
2 bt)(a c d)
( 4b2t2+24bd2t 6d4) , 6( 4b2t2+24bd2t 
6d4) < (18bt  4d2)(8d2   bt)
, 6( 4b2t2 + 24bd2t  6d4) < (18bt  4d2)(8d2   bt) holds when











2(4b2t2 24bd2t+6d4)2 , 72 (4b2t2   24bd2t+ 6d4)
2
>
(18bt  4d2)2 (9d2   2bt)2
, 72 (4b2t2   24bd2t+ 6d4)2 > (18bt   4d2)2 (9d2   2bt)2 holds











(4b2t2 24bd2t+6d4)2 , 36 (4b2t2   24bd2t+ 6d4)
2
<
(18bt  4d2)2 (8d2   bt)2
, 36 (4b2t2   24bd2t+ 6d4)2 < (18bt   4d2)2 (8d2   bt)2 holds












































C.1 Computation for solutions under local pollution
(1) Governments collude & Firms dont collude
First, we solve rm is problem:
max i = [a  b(qA + qB)]qi   cqi   d(1  ei)qi
qi
s.t. qi > 0; i 2 fA;Bg










Since two governments collude, their total welfare function is:














B   eAeB)  t2(e2A + e2B)
So we put (C1) and (C2) in it and solve the problem:














B   eAeB)  t2(e2A + e2B)














































(2) Governments dont collude & Firms collude
First, rm A and B cooperate. Their total prots function is:
 = A + B
= [a  b(qA + qB)]qA   cqA   d(1  eA)qA + [a  b(qA + qB)]qB   cqB  
d(1  eB)qB
= [a  b(qA + qB)](qA + qB)  (c+ d)(qA + qB) + d(eAqA + eBqB)
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Then we solve it as:
Max [a  b(qA + qB)](qA + qB)  (c+ d)(qA + qB) + d(eAqA + eBqB)
qA; qB
s.t. qi > 0; i 2 fA;Bg
ei 2 (0; 1)









Then we put (C5), (C6) into governmentswelfare functions and solve
governmentsproblems.
For government A,





















s.t. ei 2 (0; 1); i 2 fA;Bg
F.O.C. (16bt  6d2)eA = 5d(a  c  d)  d2eB (C7)
Similarly, we solve government Bs problem to get:
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(16bt  6d2)eB = 5d(a  c  d)  d2eA (C8)

















































(3) Governments collude & Firms collude
Now consider government also cooperate, we put (C5), (C6) into the





































































C.2 Computation for solutions under transboundary pollution
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The computation for solutions under transboundary are similar as those
under local pollution. The only di¤erence is the governments welfare func-
tion.
(1) Governments collude & Firms dont collude
First we solve rmsprots functions and get (C1), (C2).
Since governments collude, we put (C1), (C2) into their total welfare
function and solve the problem:














B   eAeB)  t(eA + eB)2
s.t. ei 2 (0; 1); i 2 fA;Bg









































(2) Governments dont collude & Firms collude
First we solve rmstotal prots function and get (C5), (C6).
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Then we put (C5), (C6) into governments As and Bs individual prots


































s.t. ei 2 (0; 1); i 2 fA;Bg








































(3) Governments collude & Firms collude
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Now consider government also cooperate, we put (C5), (C6) into the














)  t(eA + eB)2









































C.3 Proof of Propositions





















(64bt 20d2) ) enc > eF
















(4bt d2) ) qF > qGF
qG > q

F , 3t(a c d)(9bt 2d2) > 4t(a c d)(16bt 5d2) , 12bt > 7d2
























2bt   8p2d2 >
48bt  12d2 > 48bt  15d2 , F > GF > G




GF , because 36
p
2bt 16p2d2
could be smaller than 48bt  15d2 or larger than 48bt  12d2:
















(9bt 4d2)2 , (9bt 4d2)2 > (9bt 2d2)(9bt 8d2),




2(16bt 5d2)2 () 2(16bt 5d2)2 > (8bt 2d2)(64bt 





(9bt 2d2) , (64bt   25d2)(9bt   2d2) >
2(16bt 5d2)2 , 64b2t2 > 33btd2 , 64bt > 33d2 since bt > 8
9
d2 , W F > W G







In the rst stage, governments could choose collude or not collude. If
they dont collude, they would get W F or W





If governments choose collude, they would get W GF if rms choose
collude and get W G if rms dont collude. We know that rms surely choose
collude since GF > 

G. So for sure governments would get W

GF if they






nc, governments would certainly
choose collude and then rms also certainly choose collude.
(3) Proof of Proposition 4.3
Proof: 128bt  20d2 > 90bt  20d2 ) 4d(a c d)
(18bt 4d2) >
5d(a c d)























18bt  d2 > 18bt  4d2 ) 6t(a c d)
(18bt 4d2) >
6t(a c d)
(18bt d2) ) qnc > qG
bt > 8
9












(16bt d2) ) qF > qGF














(16bt d2)2 ) F > GF
bt > 8
9
d2 ) 72p2bt   4p2d2 > 96bt   6d2 ) 32bt2(a c d)2
(16bt d2)2 >
36bt2(a c d)2
(18bt d2)2 ) GF > G
18bt d2 > 18bt 4d2 ) 36bt2(a c d)2
(18bt 4d2)2 >
36bt2(a c d)2
(18bt d2)2 ) nc > G













(32bt 5d2)2 ) W GF > W F








(16bt d2) ) W GF > W G









In the rst stage, governments could choose collude or not collude. If
they dont collude, they would get W F or W





If governments choose collude, they would getW GF if rms choose collude
and get W G if rms dont collude. We know that rms surely choose collude
since GF > 

G. So for sure governments would get W

GF if they choose








F , governments would certainly
choose collude and then rms also certainly choose collude.
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